




‘Namibia, land of the brave’: Selective 






The limits to the memory of liberation are investigated with 
regard to the factors affecting a liberation movement in the 
process of achieving legitimate power in a post-colonial 
society. The case of Namibia is explored in the transition 
from anti-colonial resistance to comprehensive control, by 
the former liberation movement, over the state. The concepts 
of political rule, the state and democracy are tested against 
the impact of a liberation struggle in terms of the applied 
understanding of political dominance once access to power 
has been achieved. The political culture under a government 
with a record of liberation struggle suggests limitations to 
the implementation of democracy. 
 
 
Namibia, land of the brave, 
freedom fight we have won, 
glory to the bravery, 
whose blood watered our freedom. 
 
These are the first four lines of Namibia’s national anthem. Its melody was 
composed and selected during a competition before independence in early 1990 
and the words were added a few months later.1 The anthem is evidence of the 
                     
 I am grateful to Reinhart Koessler for his comments on the draft manuscript of this 
chapter. 
1 These introductory lines led to some raised eyebrows and concerns among members of 
the white minority with regard to the extent to which the declared notion of national 
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pride of an emerging new nation placing itself on the map of sovereign states 
after more than a century of foreign occupation and continued resistance, 
including more than two decades of an armed liberation struggle. The 
introductory words also illustrate the legacy of this struggle for post-colonial 
development. Such legacies are nothing new, and far from typically African, but 
they also have a history on the continent.2 
This chapter explores, presents and comments upon some visible features of 
a political culture affected by a militaristic orientation in the independent 
Republic of Namibia. This is not to say that Namibia is governed either by 
warlords or the military but the picture sketched by this overview highlights an 
aspect of Namibian society that, to my knowledge, has not yet been explicitly 
made a thematic subject, unlike in other societies in the region.3 It can be 
considered one of the historical, structural and psychological legacies of 
colonial rule, that an earlier study termed ‘the violent heritage’.4  
This heritage, from a dialectical point of view, shaped mentalities and 
ideologies not only among the colonizers but also among the colonized. There is 
a growing tendency to critically analyse the processes in which victims in the 
                                                  
reconciliation is taken so seriously by the newly elected political leadership of the 
country. They did not in fact contribute to eliminating their original worries in facing 
the fate of an endangered species, though subsequent experiences have so far not 
confirmed their fears. That these first lines bear striking resemblance to the concluding 
words in the United States national anthem, ‘The Star Spangled Banner’, did not occur 
to those confined to the Namibian perspective. But this is a healthy reminder that the 
subject of this chapter is clearly not typically African but is one of patriotism in nation-
building processes all over the world. 
2 See, as impressive early evidence of coming to terms with such a history in the African 
context of decolonization, the essays on various topical subjects compiled in the volume 
by A.A. Mazrui, Violence and Thought (London & Harlow, 1969). 
3 In particular the social history of Zimbabwe has in recent years produced a striking 
range of in-depth analyses dealing with the impact of the second chimurenga upon 
(post-)colonial identity formation and ideological discourse. See among more prominent 
recent examples the variety of contributions to the two volumes by N. Bhebe & T. 
Ranger (eds), Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London, Portsmouth & Harare, 
1995) and Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Oxford, Portsmouth & Harare, 
1996), and especially R. Werbner, ‘Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the 
Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe’, in R. Werbner (ed.), Memory and the 
Postcolony. African Anthropology and the Critique of Power (London & New York, 
1998).  
4 D. Soggot, Namibia: The Violent Heritage (London, 1986). Soggot has been active as 
a South African-based lawyer for several years in Namibia defending those accused in 
political trials. His story reveals numerous atrocities and the kind of human rights 
violations notorious under Apartheid, which as a legacy to the post-colonial society 
shaped the mentality of both the colonizers and the colonized. 
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role of freedom fighters became perpetrators. Breaking such taboos is necessary 
in a debate that is dealing increasingly with the content of liberation and 
reflecting (if not questioning) the concept of solidarity of the past years and 
marks the end of the cultivation of ‘heroic narratives’.5 Growing insight shows 
that armed liberation struggles were not a suitable breeding ground for the 
establishment of democratic systems of government after independence. The 
forms of resistance against repressive regimes were themselves organized along 
strictly hierarchical and authoritarian lines because otherwise they would have 
had little prospect of success. In this sense, the new societies bore the essential 
elements of the old system they had fought. Aspects of the colonial system 
reproduced themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently in the 
concepts of governance applied in post-colonial conditions. They share the 
binary view of the colonial discourse of the past.6 
Governments were formed by the anti-colonial liberation movements that 
had themselves been far from non-violent. They assumed control of the state 
machinery and reorganized themselves as political parties. The legitimacy to 
rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonization process as 
democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people. Since then 
and with varying results (and sometimes with the use of further organized 
violence, as the case of Matabeleland illustrates), they have been able to 
strengthen their political dominance and maintain control over the state. This is 
true even though in Zimbabwe at present it can be seen that these governments 
may not last forever.7  
The social transformation in these southern African societies shaped by a 
settler colonial brand, can at best be characterized as a transition from 
controlled change to changed control. The result is a new ruling political elite 
operating from commanding heights constructed in the particular context of the 
post-Apartheid societies and shaped by selective narratives and memories 
related to the war(s) of liberation. In this context, new traditions to establish an 
exclusive post-colonial legitimacy were constructed or invented under the sole 
authority of one particular agency of social forces. The ‘mystification’ of the 
                     
5 G. Harrison, ‘Bringing Political Struggle Back in African Politics, Power & 
Resistance’, Review of African Political Economy, 89 (2001), 390. See also R. Kössler 
& H. Melber, ‘The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in 
Southern Africa. A (Self-)Critical Retrospective’, in U. Engel & R. Kappel (eds), 
Germany’s Africa Policy Revisited (Münster & Hamburg, 2002). 
6 See, for example, B. Ashcroft, Post-Colonial Transformation (London & New York, 
2001), 21. 
7 See for a more detailed overview, H. Melber, ‘From Liberation Movements to 




liberators plays an essential role in this process. What has been stated with 
regard to the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe applies to Namibia’s SWAPO too. It ‘had 
since independence sought to ground the nation’s identity as well as its own 
political legitimacy in the liberation war’.8  
The evidence presented here is an attempt to collect and assess the impact of 
histories of war and violence on the post-colonial mental environment of 
Namibia, which still shapes and affects memories and their institutionalization 
in symbols, rituals and daily practices related to the present political culture and 
hegemony. By doing so, the significance of revolt and resistance in the history 
of Namibia and its utilization for the legitimacy of currently dominant patterns 
of rule under a previous liberation movement can provisionally be explored.9 
This follows the appeal by Werbner:  
 
The critique of power in contemporary Africa calls for a theoretically informed 
anthropology of memory and the making of political subjectivities. The need is to 
rethink our understanding of the force of memory, its official and unofficial forms, 
its moves between the personal and the social in postcolonial transformation.10   
 
This exploratory effort does not claim to provide any definitive answers but 
seeks to offer some thought-provoking input on reflections on the current socio-
political environment after more than a decade of Namibian independence. I 
suggest that the post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges 
predicted so convincingly by Artur Carlos Maurício Pestana, a former MPLA 
fighter. He published, under his nom de guerre, the notes he made in 1971 
during his participation in the guerrilla war in the rainforest of the Cabinda front 
in Angola for the MPLA. As a novel and narrative it offers a remarkable degree 
of sensitivity and insight into the complexity (and limits) of social 
transformation subsequent to a situation of armed resistance against foreign 
colonial rule. As the commander of the guerrilla unit (‘Fearless’) explains to the 
                     
8 J. Alexander, J. McGregor & T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in 
the ‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland (Oxford, 2000), 254. 
9 To that extent this chapter relates directly to the one by Jan-Bart Gewald in this 
volume (and vice versa). For other recent efforts to find a more systematic analytical 
context assessing the track record of the SWAPO liberation movement as the party in 
political power since independence, see H. Melber, ‘The Culture of Politics’, in H. 
Melber (ed.), Namibia – A Decade of Independence, 1990-2000 (Windhoek, 2000) and 
H. Melber, ‘Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa: The Case of Namibia’, in H. 
Melber & C. Saunders (eds), Transition in Southern Africa – Comparative Aspects. Two 
Lectures (Uppsala, 2001). 
10 R. Werbner, ‘Beyond Oblivion: Confronting Memory Crisis’, in Werbner, Memory 
and the Postcolony, 2. 
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political commissar (‘New World’), for whom he ultimately sacrifices his life in 
battle:  
 
We don’t share the same ideals. (…) You are the machine type, one of those who is 
going to set up the unique, all-powerful Party in Angola. I am the type who could 
never belong to the machine. (…) One day, in Angola, there will no longer be any 
need for rigid machines, and that is my aim. …what I want you to understand, is that 
the revolution we are making is half the revolution I want. But it is the possible. I 
know my limits and the country’s limits. My role is to contribute to this half-
revolution. (…) I am, in your terminology, adventurist. I should like the discipline of 
war to be established in terms of man and not the political objective. My guerrillas 
are not a group of men deployed to destroy the enemy, but a gathering of different, 
individual beings, each with his subjective reasons to struggle and who, moreover, 
behave as such. (…) I am happy when I see a young man decide to build himself a 
personality, even if politically that signifies individualism. (…) I cannot manipulate 
men, I respect them too much as individuals. For that reason, I cannot belong to a 
machine.11  
 
This conversation is more than fiction: it sets the parameters and social 
constraints for a post-colonial society with a history of armed resistance against 




                    
‘Let us die fighting’: Armed resistance as a historical continuity 
 
In 1960 the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) was formed 
as a result of the organizational structures emerging during the 1950s among the 
contract workers from the northern part of Namibia – Ovamboland – a region 
named after its population.12 Until the mid-1960s SWAPO was competing with 
 
11 Pepetela, Mayombe (London, 1996), 197-98.  
12 The different Ovambo communities form more than half of Namibia’s population and 
are the backbone and power base of SWAPO. The SWAPO narrative is thus strongly 
guided and influenced by an Ovambo perspective. This chapter, however, does not 
explore the regional-ethnic aspects and components of post-colonial national ideology 
in Namibia in depth. For a comprehensive official historiography on the liberation 
struggle and SWAPO’s role, see Department of Information and Publicity/SWAPO of 
Namibia, To Be Born A Nation. The Liberation Struggle for Namibia (London, 1981). 
Other semi-official historiographies include the scholarly works of two long-time 
SWAPO activists who graduated in exile from Oxford and Lund respectively: P. 
Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London, 1988) and K. Mbuende, 
Namibia, the Broken Shield: Anatomy of Imperialism and Revolution (Lund, 1986). 
Katjavivi has been the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Namibia since its 
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other anti-colonial organizations for a leadership role but its decision to launch 
an armed struggle as the ultimate means to liberate Namibia marked a turning 
point and paved the way for SWAPO’s international and local recognition as 
the most relevant organization of the Namibian people to bring about 
independence. The subsequent steps to hegemony within the anti-colonial 
resistance were constituted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
3111 of 12 December 1973, recognizing SWAPO as ‘the authentic 
representative of the Namibian people’ and its amendment in the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/146 of 20 December 1976 to be the 
‘sole and authentic’ representative. It thereby endorsed the exclusive status and 
political monopoly of SWAPO in the ongoing negotiations on behalf of the 
Namibian people. 
The armed struggle – as executed by SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) – constituted a substantial if not decisive 
step towards legitimacy in this process.13 In principle decided upon in the early 
1960s, it finally started after a ruling by the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague that denied the Namibian people a hearing on their right to self-
determination on purely legal grounds. Its announcement on 18 July 1966 
provoked a statement, released the same day by SWAPO’s external 
headquarters (then in Dar es Salaam, later in Lusaka and finally in Luanda), 
declaring that: ‘We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our 
liberation’.14 
The first military encounter between SWAPO insurgents and the South 
African army occurred on 26 August 1966 when the colonial forces attacked a 
guerrilla base at Omgulumbashe in Ovamboland (nowadays in politically 
correct post-colonial terminology more vaguely referred to as Northern 
Namibia). Subsequently, August 26 was commemorated by the United Nations 
as ‘Namibia Day’. An editorial in the June/July 1968 issue of the SWAPO 
publication Namibia News illustrates the crucial element introduced with the 
armed liberation struggle to the historiography of SWAPO, which from now on 
could claim to represent the continuity of resistance by the people of Namibia 
against foreign occupation: 
 
26 August is a day of commemoration for our people. One of our early uprisings 
against the Germans took place on this date and ever since the date has been 
                                                  
establishment in the early 1990s, while Mbuende was Deputy Minister of Agriculture, 
then SADC Executive Secretary and since 2000 a Member of Parliament. 
13 See T. Emmett, Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-
1966 (Basel, 1999), 331-34. 
14 Department of Information and Publicity/SWAPO of Namibia, To Be Born A Nation, 
177. 
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remembered. On 26 August this year it is two years since we, the people of Namibia, 
entered a new phase in our fight against the racist white minority by launching our 
armed struggle. Until then we fought by non-violent means, but this brought us 
nothing but increased violence and brutality from our enemy. When we saw there 
was no way out – the last straw was the let-down by the world community in The 
Hague – we took up arms. 
Namibia’s history contains many accounts of armed uprising against foreign 
invaders. For instance, from 1904 to 1907 the Germans faced continuous revolts 
which were led by the dynamic chiefs, Maherero and Witbooi. The Germans met the 
resistance with what they called ‘a war of extermination’, during which they 
ruthlessly killed any Namibian they could find, whether soldier or civilian. When the 
war ended, the population in parts of our country was reduced by two-thirds. In 1917 
another uprising took place, this time under the leadership of King Mandume. 
Mandume’s men fought the Boers in the South and the Portuguese in the North. 
Although this revolt was crushed, we did not lose our determination to free our 
country from white overlordship. Today we are again engaged in an armed battle 
against our enemy, but this time we cannot be stopped until we have liberated 
Namibia from the white settler regime.15  
 
With the armed struggle, SWAPO had entered a new stage in Namibian 
history. Not only did this add a further dimension to the efforts to bring about 
independence, but it also opened the way for its consolidation as the one and 
only decisive organization within the anti-colonial movement. It created the 
idea of historical continuity since the days of the early ‘primary’ anti-colonial 
resistance beginning in the late nineteenth century. This is clearly illustrated by 
the quotation above which underlines the direct links to the efforts of leaders 
among the Nama (Witbooi), the Herero (Maherero) and the Kwanyama/ 
Ovambo (Mandume) under early colonial rule to resist foreign occupation by 
means of armed resistance too. 
‘Let us die fighting’, a quote accredited to a letter by Herero Chief Samuel 
Maherero, in which he tried to convince the Nama Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi 
shortly before the first organized military attack on the German colonial 
authorities in 1904 to join the resistance, emerged during the 1980s as a 
catchphrase to link the contemporary struggle with the early history of armed 
anti-colonial struggle. It became popular as a result of a qualitatively new 
perspective within historical analysis, with subsequent prominent and also 
politically relevant impact.16 Maherero’s letter, actually sent to the Kaptein of 
                     
15 Quoted from A. de Braganca & I. Wallerstein (eds), The African Liberation Reader. 
Volume 2: The National Liberation Movements (London, 1982), 5-6. 
16 H. Drechsler, ‘Let Us Die Fighting’: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against 
German Imperialism, 1884-1914 (London, 1980). The title of the German original 
(Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft), a thesis published in the GDR in 
1966 (and published in a revised version in 1984) did not make use of the quote. See on 
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the Rehoboth Basters and instead of being handed over to Witbooi passed on to 
the Germans, contained the following appeal, which allowed later analysis to 
suggest the emergence of a common interest and alliance during early anti-
colonial resistance between hitherto divided groups: 
 
I appeal to you, my Brother, not to hold aloof from the uprising, but to make your 
voice heard so that all Africa may take up arms against the Germans. Let us die 
fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other 
calamity.17  
 
The claim to historic continuity was one of the things illustrated by the fact 
that The Combatant, the monthly organ of PLAN, in a later standard front cover 
header combined the images of Hendrik Witbooi and Tobias Hainyeko, a PLAN 
commander who was killed and praised as one of the fallen heroes.18 
SWAPO’s military activities were never as effective and successful as 
efforts on the diplomatic front. This was partly the result of the relative 
weakness of the combat units and the unfavourable geographical and geo-
strategic conditions for guerrilla warfare in many parts of the country. It was at 
the same time at least as much Namibia’s genuine status in terms of 
international law that resulted in special attention by the United Nations towards 
this ‘trust betrayed’.19 It allowed for diplomatic offensives that other anti-
                                                  
the relevance of Drechsler’s study, also in current debate, the chapter in this volume by 
Jan-Bart Gewald. 
17 Ibid. 143. For a more recent summary of the context of ‘primary’ resistance in the 
process of colonization, see H. Melber, ‘Economic and Social Formation in the Process 
of Colonisation: Society and State Before and During German Rule’, in C. Keulder 
(ed.), State, Society and Democracy. A Reader in Namibian Politics (Windhoek, 2000). 
18 The Combatant – The Monthly Organ of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN) was published from 1980 onwards in mimeographed and stapled A4 format but 
changed its layout in the mid-1980s into a more sophisticated A5 format print version. 
The relevance of the armed struggle is also illustrated by the fact that The Combatant 
was among the SWAPO publications and periodicals (such as Namibia News and 
Namibia Today) with the longest continuity and ceased publication only at the end of 
1988 with the ceasefire agreement and subsequent implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). 
19 Namibia – A Trust Betrayed had in fact been the title of a United Nations publication 
to explain the case in terms of international law. As a result, SWAPO received not only 
support from the majority of member states in the United Nations General Assembly, as 
already mentioned by its recognition as ‘sole and authentic representative’, but could 
subsequently claim observer status to the United Nations and was supported by a United 
Nations Council for Namibia, as well as a later established United Nations Institute for 
Namibia – both agencies collaborating closely with SWAPO or in the latter case even 
run by a considerable number of SWAPO cadres. For a recent comprehensive summary 
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colonial movements rarely had at their disposal. But without the existence of the 
armed struggle, the diplomatic and political successes as well as the internal 
mobilization of Namibians could not have been achieved to such a degree.  
 
 
‘To be born a nation’: The armed struggle as a midwife 
 
The battlefield offered few, if any, victories over the South African forces of 
occupation. The war was waged mainly in the Angolan border area and on 
foreign soil. But however much a military victory might have boosted morale, 
defeats contributed to a growing identity in the struggle. Seen in this light, the 
‘ravages of war’20 did not only have a devastating impact on the further course 
of the struggle for liberation but also brought together the oppressed Namibian 
majority. The collective trauma of the Cassinga massacre hence symbolized not 
defeat but a determination to resist and to make sacrifices. This refugee camp in 
southern Angola was bombed – as the height of cynicism and in an obvious 
effort to sabotage the acceptance of the decolonization plan as defined in the 
United Nation Security Council Resolution 435 – on 4 May 1978 (Ascension 
Day) by the South African army.21 The several hundred victims (mainly women 
and children) have remained a symbol of the Namibian struggle for 
independence ever since.  
The idea of martyrdom created in every case of violence exercised by the 
occupation army and police, both in exile as well as on the home front, in police 
cells and in the townships, added to the consolidation of resistance under the 
SWAPO banner. The glorification of resistance and sacrifices on the battlefield 
were articulated in numerous (often crude) praise poems published in 
SWAPO’s various publications. One, which gave the title to the only published 
anthology documenting the spirit of these days, ends with the following lines: 
 
We fear not your beatings 
Neither your brutal bombardments 
                                                  
and documentation of the role of the United Nations in the dispute, see L.C.W. Kaela, 
The Question of Namibia (London & New York, 1996). 
20 Described in some detail in B. König, Namibia – The Ravages of War (London, 1983) 
and D. Herbstein & J. Evenson, The Devils are Among Us. The War for Namibia 
(London, 1989). 
21 The best accounts are A. Heywood, The Cassinga Event (Windhoek, 1994) and M.Y. 
Nangolo & T. Sellström, Kassinga. A Story Untold (Windhoek, 1995). As the titles 
show, Cassinga is also referred to as Kassinga. 
  
314 Melber 
For you cannot smash our strength 
We so united and strong 
Your flesh and heart we shall bear.22  
 
The same volume includes a poem about Cassinga, which ends with a similar 
appeal to the masses, reminding them of the legacy left behind by the dead and 
the obligation of survivors still suffering from oppression to fight for liberation: 
 
They have died for our country, 
They have died for our people. 
Their blood is shed – but not in vain! 
Their brightest sacrifice – won’t be in vain! 
The task is over to you and me, 
The task is given to all of us, 
We have to continue from where they ended, 
Never betray their sacred blood! 
Their blood is shed – but not in vain! 
Their highest sacrifice – won’t be in vain! 
Ensure the success of the struggle! 
Defend the revolution for the good of all!23 
 
Frantz Fanon’s classification of this mode of expression is a relevant 
characterization of the ‘midwife’ function the armed struggle was able to 
assume in the creation of a national consciousness. For him, this ‘literature of 
combat’ 
                     
22 F. Tshirunga, ‘It Is No More a Cry’, in H. Melber (ed.), It Is No More a Cry. 
Namibian Poetry in Exile (Basel, 1982), 38. 
23 N. Wakolele, ‘Kassinga’, in ibid. 47. In the early 1980s, the author was a student at 
the United Nations Institute in Lusaka. When he died in the mid-1990s, he was 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Namibia. Other 
authors of the ‘literature of combat’ included the current Namibian ambassador to 
Germany, Hinyangerwa Asheeke. I hereby admit to have actively disseminated the 
revolutionary pathos and phraseology of two decades ago without much of a critical 
distance, as the introductory essay to this aforementioned volume testifies: H. Melber, 
‘Colonialism, Culture and Resistance: The Case of Namibia’, in ibid. As a member of 
SWAPO since 1974 and banned from entering Namibia after 1975 until independence, I 
was part of the dominant anti-colonial spirit in exile, propagating the gospel of the 
national liberation struggle with few or no doubts concerning the absolute moral 
superiority of the historical mission. While I do not see a reason to regret the 
commitment of the time or to revoke my affiliation to SWAPO and its goals and ideals 
of national sovereignty, I am having second thoughts on some of the issues then 
unnoticed by myself from today’s perspective. 
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…calls on the whole people to fight for their existence as a nation. It is a literature of 
combat because it moulds the national consciousness, giving it form and contours and 
flinging open before it new and boundless horizons; it is a literature of combat because 
it assumes responsibility, and because it is the will to liberty expressed in terms of time 
and space.24  
 
Praise poems have remained a relevant mode of expression in the context of 
post-colonial Namibian culture and politics, though their content has changed 
from revolutionary pathos to other forms of similarly robust patriotism.25 The 
socio-psychological impact of the armed struggle to the formation and 
consolidation of an emerging identity of a Namibian nation in combat for 
independence is an obvious message from the quoted documentary evidence 
and is also reflected in SWAPO’s national anthem, the words of which followed 
the tune of ‘Nkosi Sikeleli Afrika’: 
 
Honour to the heroes of Namibia 
Glory to their blood and bravery 
We give our love and loyalty 
For their blood sustains us 
To fight till victory!26  
 
The armed struggle was conceived as an integral part of the battle for liberation 
among the SWAPO activists by the early 1970s and considered to be a shared 
responsibility. Evidence of this is in one of the recommendations tabled by a 
report compiled after investigations into dissent and power struggles within 
SWAPO in the mid-1970s. The conflicts were a result of frustrations over issues 
related to the armed struggle, the relationship between the political and the 
military as well as the treatment of combatants.27 The Commission of Inquiry 
emphasized: 
 
                     
24 F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth, 1967), 193. 
25 Including a collection of praise poetry on President Sam Nujoma. 
26 Verse three of the national anthem, quoted from SWAPO News and Views, Special 
Issue, 1 (1989) 2, 52. Any resemblance to the first lines of Namibia’s national anthem 
quoted at the beginning is of course not purely coincidental!   
27 The most detailed account so far on these internal tensions and conflicts are presented 
by C. Leys & J.S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword (London 
& Athens, 1995) and L. Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by 
Other Means (Basel, 1998). Both studies offer the best explanatory and analytical 
framework so far for the legitimizing function of the armed struggle in SWAPO’s 
strategy, relevant for substantial subsequent practices and their ideological justification. 
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the framework of the principle of armed struggle as being the only viable and 
effective means of achieving total liberation. Within this principle all SWAPO 
members are soldiers. As a rule all SWAPO officials should spend at least two 
months a year at the front.28 
 
Namibia’s ultimate decolonization in a transitional phase with direct United 
Nations involvement during 1989/1990 was brought about by a combination of 
local, regional and global factors. The military aspect, though certainly not 
decisive, was one of them. SWAPO, in its efforts to underscore its claim to have 
been the ultimate force of liberation through the barrel of a gun, presented a 
different view in line with its self-image. This was expressed in what was 
probably the last issue of The Combatant, which for ten years published news 
from the battlefield on a regular basis: 
 
…the intensification of the armed liberation struggle for the last 22 years has finally 
made South Africa seek a negotiated solution to Namibia’s independence problem 
and avert a humiliating military defeat that would shatter its dreams of being the so-
called regional superpower.29 
 
In fact, an emphasis on the military dimension attached to the liberation 
struggle almost derailed the transition to independence. On 1 April 1989, the 
day of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 
(1978), many of the several hundred SWAPO combatants gathered in Northern 
Namibia were massacred in cold blood by South African troops in spite of a 
ceasefire agreement.30 They were blamed for having invaded an area outside 
their originally confined (Angolan) bases in violation of the ceasefire 
agreement. South Africa claimed, on the basis of reconnaissance evidence, that 
PLAN insurgents had sneaked into Namibia to create the impression that they 
had been occupying bases inside the country (a fact which would have given 
additional support to SWAPO claims that it was playing a relevant military role 
by operating from Namibian territory). While SWAPO still officially denies that 
the PLAN fighters had been ordered only a few days earlier to move into 
                     
28 ‘Report of the Findings and Recommendations of the John ya Otto Commission of 
Inquiry into Circumstances which Led to the Revolt of SWAPO Cadres between June, 
1974 and April, 1976’, submitted 4 June 1976 to the SWAPO Central Committee at its 
meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, July 1976 (unpublished), 16. I am not aware, however, that 
this recommended rule was indeed applied. 
29 The Combatant, 10 (1988) 5, 7. 
30 A detailed but unashamedly biased pro-South African description of the events is 
offered by P. Stiff, Nine Days of War. Namibia – Before, During and After (Alberton, 
1989). 
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Namibian territory, and vigorously refutes any other interpretation,31 serious 
evidence points in a different direction.32 Be that as it may, the hundreds of 
young men caught by surprise had to pay the highest price and sacrificed their 
lives on a battlefield that was no longer supposed to exist.33  
In the Republic of Namibia’s first hours, the first (and so far only) president 
– who has also been SWAPO’s president since its foundation – did not forget to 
remember the price of liberation paid by so many. He closed his inaugural 
speech with the following words: 
 
Master of Ceremony, Sir, in accepting the sacred responsibility which the Namibian 
people have placed on me, as the first President of the Republic of Namibia, I would 
like to bow and pay homage to our fallen heroes and heroines, whose names 
Namibia’s present and future generations will sing in songs of praise and whose 
martyrdom they will intone. 
In conclusion, I move, in the name of our people, to declare that Namibia is forever 
free, sovereign and independent!34  
 
 
‘Where others wavered’: Post-colonial war narratives and 
militarism 
 
It should come as no surprise that Namibia’s society today still bears the scars 
of its violent colonial history. The official political discourse, with the national 
                     
31 See, for example, the surprisingly offending remarks in President Sam Nujoma´s 
autobiography where he accuses Martti Ahtisaari as the highest United Nations official 
in charge of Namibian decolonization ‘to be more concerned with his career at the 
United Nations than with his responsibilities towards the oppressed people of Namibia’. 
He further maintains that ‘Ahtisaari’s action betrayed our cause’ and that he ‘plotted’. S. 
Nujoma, Where Others Wavered (London, 2001), 396-97.  
32 See the interview with Martti Ahtisaari, previously Head of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia, then in charge of the United Nations Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG), in I. Soiri & P. Peltola, Finland and National Liberation in Southern 
Africa (Uppsala, 1999), 185-86.  
33 There are earlier sacrifices of a similar nature, though not the same dimension, on 
record. See the failed incursion by SWAPO combatants into Eastern Hereroland in the 
late 1970s, motivated by other deliberations than any chance for a military success. Jan-
Bart Gewald’s reference to this incident in his chapter in this volume indicates that the 
young people were sent to their death for reasons of political mobilization among the 
Herero. 
34 Quoted from the speech as reproduced in full length in Nujoma, Where Others 
Wavered, 447. Nujoma dedicated his autobiography ‘to the gallant sons and daughters, 
heroes and heroines under the leadership of their vanguard SWAPO, and to those who 
struggled and sacrificed their precious lives for the total liberation of Namibia’. 
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liberation movement assuming the power of definition by seizing legitimate and 
democratically based control over the state as the elected Namibian government 
since then, reflects a continued affinity towards authoritarian structures required 
to wage war. The dominant narrative of post-colonial Namibia is presented here 
by means of several examples. It has been suggested elsewhere with reference 
to Zimbabwe’s second chimurenga that the ‘variety of appropriations of 
violence is the dating of events’ and ‘the memorising of dates of wars and 
battles (as well as biographies of great men – and women) as markers of 
history’.35  
Namibian independence started by choosing such a day: 21 March 1990 was 
agreed upon as Independence Day following a SWAPO suggestion to the 
Constituent Assembly to honour the memory of the Sharpeville massacre in 
South Africa by opting for this date. Though largely unknown in the public 
sphere in Namibia, it reiterates the liberation movement’s commitment to 
remember victims of struggles in times of peace. On 4 May, Kassinga Day – a 
public holiday – marks the biggest single massacre of refugees in exile. Heroes 
Day on 26 August, introduced earlier as Namibia Day by the United Nations, is 
also a public holiday and commemorates the beginning of the armed struggle in 
Omgulumbashe (where a memorial has since been erected).36 Human Rights 
Day on 10 December focuses, in the Namibian context, on the violent 
oppression in 1959 when police opened fire on those demonstrating against the 
planned forceful removal of black urban residents from the ‘old location’ in 
Windhoek to the new ‘township’ of Katutura, killing eleven people.37  
These national public holidays tend to be monopolized by SWAPO as the 
party in control of government. Their one-sided celebrations, including the 
display of party emblems by the head of state during official ceremonies,
                     
35 H. Schmidt, ‘Neither War Nor Peace: Making Sense of Violence’, in G. Elwert, S. 
Feuchtwang & D. Neubert (eds), Dynamics of Violence (Berlin, 1999), 219. 
36 It is also revealing that the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) runs a holding company 
with the registered name ‘August 26’. It owns a diamond mine in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, with an NDF general as the company’s managing director.  
37 This incident marked a turning point in the history of the Namibian liberation struggle 
in as far as it contributed to the formation of SWAPO in early 1960 and the subsequent 
decision to ultimately resort to an armed struggle against colonial repression. See for 
documentary evidence, D. Ridgway, M. Jafta, N. Kautja, M. Oliphant & K. Shipingana, 
An Investigation of the Shooting at the Old Location on 10 December 1959 (Windhoek, 
1991) and an eyewitness account, J. Ya-Otto, Battlefront Namibia (London, 1982) in 
the chapter entitled ‘The Windhoek Massacre’, 34-54. 
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Heroes’ Acre (and detail of relief) on the outskirts of Windhoek, July 2002, just 
prior to its official opening 
Photos by Henning Melber 
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motivated a political opponent to articulate public criticism in parliament.38 In 
addition to these national public holidays, particular group memories contribute 
to aspects of regional-ethnic identity in a historical perspective. In Okahandja, 
the Herero commemorate their war against the Germans at the end of August.39 
So do the Witbooi Nama in Gibeon each year in October.40 Kaptein Hendrik 
Witbooi, the leader they pay most prominent tribute to by re-enacting the war 
against the Germans, has been reproduced on the different Namibian dollar 
notes introduced as the country’s own currency in the early 1990s.41  
A monument outside the capital Windhoek complements the war memorial 
constructed in Omgulumbashe according to the declared aims of the political 
leadership in SWAPO. Plans for a Heroes’ Acre have been implemented with 
the assistance of North Korea.42 The state’s annual budget for 2001/2002 
financed the construction work at a site in the direct vicinity of the military base 
of Luiperds Valley. Commentary in the local daily German newspaper 
characterized this project as a gigantic symbol of a late-nationalist triumph.43 
North Korean architects are also designing an Independence Museum to be built 
next to the Alte Feste (the colonial fort erected by the German Schutztruppe) 
and in close vicinity to both the Tintenpalast (the previous administrative 
                     
38 A former SWAPO activist in exile (during the first five years of independence the 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and since 2000 an elected 
parliamentary representative of the opposition Congress of Democrats tabled a motion 
in early April 2002. He blamed SWAPO, in the light of the recent Independence Day 
ceremonies, for using national commemorative events and public holidays for party 
propaganda and thereby acting against the spirit of national reconciliation. See M. 
Springer, ‘Feier Missbraucht’, Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek), 9 April 2002. 
39 See the chapter in this volume by Jan-Bart Gewald for a comprehensive analysis of 
the historical events and their psychological and political implications for Namibian 
politics.  
40 See R. Kössler, ‘Tradition als Politische Strategie. Vom Witbooi-Fest zum Heroes 
Day in Gibeon, Namibia’, in A. Eckert & J. Müller (eds), Transformationen der 
Europäischen Expansion vom 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert (Rehberg-Loccum, 1997), 62-74; 
R. Kössler, ‘Rebuilding Societies from Below: Reflections on Heroes Day, Gibeon, 
October 1995’, in R. Kössler, H. Melber & P. Strand, Development From Below: A 
Namibian Case Study (Uppsala, 2002). 
41 The subject is further touched upon in Jan-Bart Gewald’s chapter in this volume with 
reference to the monuments of three Namibian patriots from different regions and 
population groups unveiled in Windhoek in 2001, after the statue of Hosea Kutako had 
to remain covered under a layer of black plastic for several years. 
42 See on the symbolic relevance of such a memorial site under Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe (also erected with North Korean involvement), N.J. Kriger, 
‘The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and 
National Identity’, in Bhebe & Ranger, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. 
43 E. Hofmann, ‘Selbsterkenntnis’, Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek), 6 February 2002.  
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offices of the German colonial authority, now the National Assembly) and the 
Christuskirche. The old colonial monument of the German equestrian 
Schutztruppenreiter, which has looked down from the hillside onto the centre of 
town for about 90 years, is to be moved, due to construction work, to a less 
prominent site a few hundred metres away.44 
Sam Nujoma, as the political father figure of Namibian independence, 
personifies in a marked and pronounced way the cultivation of the memories of 
the liberation war beyond such changes in infrastructure. Testimony to this is 
not only to be found in his autobiography, which ends with independence and 
words from one of his earlier speeches during the days of the struggle: 
 
When the history of a free and independent Namibia is written one day, SWAPO 
will go down as having stood firm where others have wavered: that it sacrificed for 
the sacred cause of liberation where others have compromised.45 
 
The president’s vivid memory of combat motivated him in May 2001 to a 
physical re-enactment of a war scene in front of a television camera when he 
was visited on his farm by a South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
team. The scenes, in which he throws himself to the ground and imitates 
shooting, are in stark contrast to the expectations of how an elder statesman 
ought to behave in public. To the embarrassment of State House, the pictures 
were included in a less than favourable profile of Namibia’s head of state 
broadcast in neighbouring South Africa in a popular documentary series. 
Following official protests by the Namibian government on biased reporting, 
the film crew had to offer an apology. 
The tendency towards glorification of the history of warfare for liberation 
(which by implication is for a just cause and hence tends to embrace 
affirmatively the dubious notion of a ‘just war’) is an obvious symptom in 
Namibian society today. It plays a relevant role in the current symbolism and 
rituals of the post-colonial political culture. (After all, the pictures in the 
controversial film documentary did indeed show the president.) It also allowed 
for a rather problematic treatment of the far-reaching decision to become 
militarily involved in ongoing conflicts beyond Namibia’s borders (in the sense 
of showing little visible concern for the consequences). In August 1998 troops 
were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where they came to the 
                     
44 Ironically, some of the newly built manifestations of independence (including the 
Constitutional Court constructed in the mid-1990s close to the site of the future 
Independence Museum) bear some obvious resemblance to the Nazi architecture of 
Albert Speer. 
45 This quote is taken from the brochure SWAPO Information on SWAPO: An Historical 
Profile (Lusaka, 1978). 
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rescue of President Kabila. Since the end of 1999, Namibia has also been 
directly involved in the ongoing war in neighbouring Angola, where the 
Namibian army has been involved in fights with UNITA guerrillas. In neither 
case was parliament or the cabinet consulted, and decisions were taken solely 
by the head of state who is also in command of the army and entitled to act in 
the national interest.46 In a parliamentary debate on the additional budget in 
November 1998, Namibia’s foreign minister declared categorically that the 
debate over Namibia’s intervention in the DRC had come to an end and labelled 
any further criticism as ‘un-African’. The first soldiers officially returning from 
the Congo in June 2001 were honoured with a heroes’ reception.47 In his New 
Year’s Message for 2002, President Nujoma deemed this military involvement a 
remarkable event: 
 
I can state with pride that the gallant soldiers of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) 
and other SADC Allied Forces showed great courage and bravery … Our soldiers 
completed this task with honour and returned home in triumph…48 
 
 
‘One Namibia, one nation’? 
 
More than a decade after independence, many of the high-ranking political 
office bearers still have a track record as comrades dating back to SWAPO’s 
formative years during the 1960s and 1970s. The situational application of 
militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion or exclusion in terms of the post-colonial 
national identity is common practice. It demonstrates that the declared notions 
of national reconciliation and the slogan of ‘unity in diversity’ do not always 
receive the desired acknowledgement in terms of political pluralism and 
tolerance. Namibian identity is instead defined increasingly by those in power 
along narrow lines of definition and (self-)understanding. What has been 
suggested with reference to the understanding of post-independent power 
                     
46 While he was chairing the United Nations General Assembly sessions in New York, 
his deputy minister, in an acting capacity, accused the print media in Namibia critical of 
Namibia’s involvement in the Angolan conflict in January 2000 of being a ‘fifth 
column’ of UNITA and of damaging the country’s reputation. 
47 See the eyewitness report by R. Kössler, ‘Szenen einer Heimkehr. Siegesfeier auf der 
Independence Avenue in Windhoek’, afrika süd, 4 (2001). 
48 ‘Let’s Look Back at the Great Events’. President’s New Year Message, Die 
Republikein (Windhoek), 2 January 2002. Shortly afterwards, when a volcano erupted 
in the Congolese border area of Goma during late January 2002, the president publicly 
expressed his regrets that this human tragedy had taken place on enemy territory 
(implying that Namibia would not be able to offer any kind of humanitarian aid to the 
victims). 
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relations in neighbouring Zimbabwe has much relevance for the Namibian case 
too: 
 
…whilst power relations had changed, perceptions of power had not changed. The 
layers of understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialisation and 
memory, continued to operate. …actors had changed, however, the way in which the 
new actors executed power in relation to opposition had not, as their mental 
framework remained in the colonial setting. Patterns from colonial rule of ‘citizens’ 
ruling the ‘subjects’ repeated and reproduced.49 
 
This is reflected in a dichotomy of polarized perceptions along the ‘we-they’ 
divide. If you are not with SWAPO, you are considered to be an enemy. Given 
the blurred boundaries between party, government and state under a factual one-
party system (with SWAPO having an overwhelming majority of votes 
allowing it to rule as it pleases) and the growing equation of the party being the 
government and the government being the state, any opposition or dissent is 
considered to be hostile and the person involved is branded an enemy of the 
people and the national interest. 
The so-called ex-detainee issue is a classic case in point. This is a group of 
former SWAPO members who were detained in exile following various internal 
disagreements that led to mass repression. From the early 1980s onward, 
hundreds if not thousands were kept in dungeons in southern Angolan camps 
where they were tortured and executed as suspected South African spies.50 
Many did not survive. Most of the others were traumatized for the rest of their 
lives. Following their return to independent Namibia, they have not been 
rehabilitated, despite numerous efforts. Nor was SWAPO prepared to be held 
accountable on this issue of violating human rights in its own ranks during the 
struggle. Instead, the ‘ex-detainees’ continued to live under the stigma of being 
considered by many as traitors and collaborators with the Apartheid regime and 
directly or indirectly held responsible for the deaths of numerous Namibian 
refugees, combatants and political activists both at home and in exile. Their 
plight was brought to renewed public attention by the personal account of an 
external witness with moral credibility.51 It provoked a considerable reaction 
                     
49 K.P. Yap, ‘Uprooting the Weeds: Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland 
Conflict, 1980-1987’, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam (2000), 312-13 (original 
emphasis). 
50 See for a concise summary of the issue and its implications, G. Lamb, ‘Putting 
Belligerents in Context: The Cases of Namibia and Angola’, in S. Chesterman (ed.), 
Civilians in War (Boulder & London, 2001). For more details, see Leys & Saul, 
Namibia’s Liberation Struggle.  
51 S. Groth, Namibia – The Wall of Silence (Wuppertal, 1995). For detailed accounts on 
the subsequent controversies, see L. Dobell, ‘Silence in Context: Truth and/or 
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from SWAPO. Advocates of attempts to seek reconciliation through open 
discussion were accused of acting against the national interest. A senior 
political activist and member of parliament in a public address at a rally in 
Northern Namibia (Ovamboland) encouraged the audience to burn the 
incriminating book that had raised the issue anew. The party released a public 
statement that it  
 
cannot allow this country to be made ungovernable and be turned into a chaotic and 
lawless society by irresponsible, unpatriotic elements and foreign remainents (sic!) 
of fascism and apartheid.52  
 
Such an attitude displays striking similarities to the failure in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe to come to terms with the atrocities committed during the mid-1980s 
by the special units using violence against the civilian population on behalf of 
the central state authority by ZANU-PF in Matabeleland: 
 
The metaphor of ‘opening old wounds’ was a powerful one, invoked by former Zapu 
and ZANU-PF politicians as well as by ordinary citizens and human rights groups. 
The ‘wounds’ stood as markers of a history of violence, inscribed on both 
individuals and the body politic; ‘opening’ them meant public probing. Whether 
they had ever healed, and hence stood to be ‘opened’, whether ‘opening’ them 
constituted a destructive or a healing act, were subjects of contention which begged 
a range of questions regarding the proper commemoration of the dead and 
appropriate ways in which history might be invoked in the present without ‘tearing 
the nation apart’.53 
 
As a result of the new taboos, those reminding the new rulers of an 
‘unfinished business’ of such a nature are the targets of personalized defamation 
campaigns with the aim to discredit the individuals, normally on the basis of 
accusations that they betrayed the struggle. One of the previous SWAPO 
members, who during the exile years was originally trained in the Soviet Union 
but then left the organization in 1980, has established a National Society for 
Human Rights (NSHR) in independent Namibia. It is accredited in an advisory 
status with the United Nations and cooperates with both Amnesty International 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The 
                                                  
Reconciliation in Namibia’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 23 (1997) and C. 
Lombard, ‘The Detainee Issue: An Unresolved Test Case for SWAPO, the Churches 
and Civil Society’, in I. Diener & O. Graefe (eds), Contemporary Namibia. The First 
Landmarks of a Post-Apartheid Society (Windhoek, 2001). 
52 Media Statement by SWAPO Party on the so-called Detainee Issue, 12 March 1996, 
1. 
53 Alexander, McGregor & Ranger, Violence and Memory, 259. 
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NSHR is a highly critical human rights watchdog and at times very negative (if 
not prejudiced) concerning government policy. It regularly raises publicly 
issues concerning individual cases of violence exercised by the army and police. 
The Namibian army’s quarterly NDF Journal in its issue at the end of 2001 
accused the NSHR director of having deserted the liberation struggle, 
disseminating lies and propaganda.54  
Other political opponents of SWAPO are similarly stigmatized. A previous 
guerrilla fighter, who after being captured spent several years on Robben Island, 
became a militant trade-union leader after his release. He was then appointed 
deputy minister and later ambassador to the United Kingdom before he 
articulated open dissent with the policy of the SWAPO leadership and resigned 
from his prestigious diplomatic post. After his subsequent suspension from the 
Central Committee, of which he was a member, he left the party and founded a 
new political opposition party campaigning for the parliamentary and 
presidential elections at the end of 1999. SWAPO responded with an 
orchestrated smear campaign, denouncing him personally as a former South 
African agent who had sacrificed the lives of his comrades in arms.55 Other 
personalized attacks similar to the two examples just presented, aiming to 
discredit the individuals, disclose patterns of a war mentality that still guides 
opinion leaders in the former liberation movement. 
While the constitutionally enshrined civic rights and political liberties that 
exist in Namibia are formally defined and coded essentials of a plural 
democracy, the dominant political culture does not support a vibrant civil 
society. Instead it divides the people along narrowly defined yardsticks of 
loyalty. A professor of public law involved in the process of drafting the 
Namibian constitution has hence described the hostility and intolerance 
displayed towards civil society actors as a worrying sign: 
 
Lawyers assisting the inhabitants of Kaokoland in 1999 with respect to Government 
plans for a dam in the Kunene River (which would have flooded ancestral land) 
were severely criticised and their involvement equated with undermining Namibia’s 
ideals. The same fate met academics writing critically about the elections of 1999. 
Such reaction may be indicative of personal intolerance; it unfortunately also 
reflects negatively on the political culture and lack of tolerance in society and the 
State apparatus.56 
                     
54 See the articles in Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek) of 24 and 25 January 2002. 
55 While SWAPO maintained that it was in possession of evidence to prove this 
accusation, it never explained why it had co-opted him into the upper echelons of the 
party and government structure after independence until his own articulation of dissent.  
56 G. Erasmus, ‘The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian Statehood and Politics’, in 




How issues can escalate under growing intolerance towards deviations from 
the increasingly narrow-minded national norm became obvious in August 1999. 
A secessionist Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM), aiming at autonomy from 
Namibia, launched an unsuccessful attack in the isolated and marginalized 
northeastern part of the country, the Caprivi Strip.57 This could be seen as an 
unrealistic response to failed integration in nation-building processes based 
more on the exclusion than inclusion of minorities. The desperate military 
attack culminated in the subsequent proclamation of a state of emergency for 
the first time in the history of the Republic of Namibia. The serious loss of any 
sense of reality on the side of the secessionists met its match in an over-reaction 
by the state and its security organs (the army and police).58 A background article 
concluded that, in retrospect, the attack in the Caprivi led to a new stage of 
national chauvinism, guided by the primacy of the military.59 
On the basis of its quasi-monopoly of political power, SWAPO displays an 
exclusionist tendency, which defines nation building in terms of marginalizing 
‘the others’ as enemies. Namibia remains – despite the liberation movement’s 
earlier claims of fighting for ‘one Namibia, one nation’ to establish a post-
colonial society characterized by ‘unity in diversity’ – a deeply divided society. 
Similar to what has been diagnosed with regard to neighbouring Zimbabwe, 
‘the postcolonial state has sponsored a whole complex of elite memorialism’,60 
but by doing so at the same time has buried other relevant memories: 
 
…the state has itself become the agent of nostalgia, for the sake of nation-building; 
heritage is state cultural policy, often in an anti-colonial appeal inventing tradition 
for an authentic past; (…) 
                     
57 See for background information to the event, H. Melber, ‘Grenzen einer Nation: 
Koloniale Territorien und Staatsentwicklung – das Beispiel Namibia’, in Geopolitik. 
Zur Ideologiekritik politischer Raumkonzepte (Wien, 2001). 
58 Amnesty International reacted to the physical violence exercised by the state actors 
against the accused secessionists and the civilian population by articulating official 
concern over the violation of human rights. Local NGOs such as the Legal Assistance 
Centre and the National Society for Human Rights expressed public criticism on several 
occasions about the heavy-handed treatment of both civilians and arrested suspects. At 
the time of writing, more than a hundred prisoners accused of high treason had already 
been under arrest without trial for almost two and a half years, during which time 
several had died. 
59 G. Hopwood, ‘Caprivi – A Year After’, The Namibian (Windhoek), 2 August 2000. 
See also the account published by the Human Rights Committee of South Africa, 
Namibia in Focus (Johannesburg, 1999), 22-28. 
60 Werbner, ‘Beyond Oblivion’, 8. 
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Despite the weighty monumentalism or the substantial flow of material and 
immaterial tribute from the redistributive state to its honoured citizens, the 
commemoration of the nation is remarkably fragile. (…) Tensions emerge in a 
variety of ways, sometimes explosively subverting the carefully scripted course of 
state pomp and ceremony. The state theatrics, so full of impassioned appeals to 
higher moral bonds in the ‘undying struggle for national freedom’, are risky. …the 
controversies over remembered identity and postwar trauma heighten as the 
postcolony itself transforms from an early period of triumphalism to a current one of 
widespread disaffection, subverting the regime’s mandate and legitimacy.61  
 
Namibia has not yet copied the two decades of post-colonial experiences of 
Zimbabwe as summarized in this diagnosis, but the writing is on the wall.62  
In mid-December 2001, President Sam Nujoma attended a street re-naming 
ceremony as the guest of honour in the coastal town of Swakopmund. This town 
with its particular German flavour had its main street named after Kaiser 
Wilhelm – an anachronism today. Some of the German-speaking business 
community rendered an unfortunate disservice to the meaning of reconciliation 
when they strongly objected to the overdue abandoning of such a colonial relict. 
In reaction to their protest, the president explained in his speech that the 
population of Namibia in an independent Namibia has to honour its currently 




61 Ibid. 1 & 8. 
62 Evidence of this is also the embarrassing degree of uncritical solidarity with the 
Mugabe regime under ZANU-PF on the occasion of the presidential elections in 
Zimbabwe. For a summary of the SWAPO (and in fact Namibian government) position 
see H. Melber, ‘Zimbabwe and “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness”’, in H. Melber 
(ed.), Zimbabwe and Beyond (Uppsala, 2002). 
